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Abstract 
The paper argues that the maltreatment/cruelty and 
destruction of animals common in Malawi is rooted in an 
African form of utilitarian ethics and a biased conception of 
animals that is promoted by Umunthu/Ubuntu ethical 
discourse. It explores the possibility of developing or 
discovering a moral ground for animal ethics discourse in the 
African context. Finally the paper proposes a Kantian version 
of animal rights as a way of dealing with various forms of 
cruelty towards animals in Malawi. 
 
1. Introduction 
The treatment of animals across the globe has been a source of constant 
theoretical wrangling. The debate about animal protection from all forms of 
cruelty from their human counterparts raises many complex philosophical as 
well as ethical questions.1 Often this debate is dominated by the question 
whether animals have rights or not (Crisp 1998: 476-478; Dwivedi, 1990; 
Jamieson, 1990, 2008). The debate is complicated further when one realizes 
that rights which originate from law, moral philosophy, and sometimes a 
combination of these disciplines usually presuppose the primacy of human 
welfare over anything else. To be specific, it is claimed that human rights 
enhance good life for human beings. In the same way, it is expected that 
animal rights enhance good life for animals. But what is the basis of good life 
for animals which ordinarily appear to lack qualities that make human beings 
deserve special treatment? This notwithstanding, there is no agreement on 
                                                            
1 The issue of animal rights in African context is often studied under 
African environmental ethics. For further reading on African environmental 
ethics see Ogungbemi (1997) and Ojomo (2011). 




whether animals have rights or not. While some think non-human animals 
deserve the same treatment as human animals (van Hooft and Millar 2005), 
others think animals do not deserve any right at all. The debate on animal 
treatment in terms of their rights is further complicated by the fact that even 
the question of rights is not a settled one. Rights, in general, and human rights, 
specifically, are sometimes treated with suspicion by scholars. If some people 
treat the question of human rights with suspicion, what more with animal 
rights? 
 
As early as 1970, Malawi Laws already contained a well-defined position on 
the subject of cruelty towards ‘domesticated animals’ or ‘captive animals’ 
(non-domestic) (Protection of Animals Act 1970, Chapter 66). In spite of this 
advanced thinking, Malawi is still one of the African countries where animals 
are continuously subjected to maltreatment. For example, the ‘Lilongwe 
Society for the Protection and Care for Animals’ (LSCPCA) in January 2014 
testified in a court case against cruelty towards animals. This maltreatment 
was inflicted on animals by the Universal Security Animals.2 Those 
responsible for this maltreatment were asked to pay a fine or risk 12 months 
imprisonment. The mishandling of tamed animals is not only experienced by 
security companies but it is a common phenomenon across Malawi. There are 
cases where some animals are abused by children, and at times by grown-up 
subjects without any reason (for example, stoning dogs or cats without any 
cause). City councils in Malawi have often considered shooting animals, 
especially dogs, that have no homes as a solution to avoid the spread of 
diseases such as rabies. This strategy has often been very cruel towards 
abandoned animals. Other forms of maltreatment of animals include beating 
them for no cause; slaughtering; by strangulation, depriving them of food; 
transporting them for long distances without water, food and proper 
ventilation; carrying animals, such as chickens, up-side down on bicycles or in 
ones hands. 
 
In order to stop this maltreatment and destruction of animals, the government 
and other concerned organizations tried to protect animals in different areas. 
For example, the Malawi Animal Protection Act of 1970 (Chapter 66: 3a-3e) 
                                                            
2 See LSCPCA official website: http://www.animal-
kind.org/malawigroup.html 




indicates different forms of cruelty forbidden in Malawi. The first offence of 
cruelty in this Act is found in the following passage: 
 
If any person – shall cruelly beat, kick, ill-
treat, override, overload, torture, infuriate or 
terrify any animal, or shall cause or procure, 
or, being the owner, permit any animal to be 
so used, or shall by wantonly or unreasonably 
doing or omitting to do any act, or causing or 
procuring the commission or omission of any 
act, cause any unnecessary suffering to be so 
caused to any animal (Protection of Animals 
Act 1970, Chapter 66, 3a). 
 
In fighting against cruelty of animals the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security recently supported the initiative of International Organizations 
dealing with animal protection such as LSCPAC in 2008. There are many 
other international organizations that are working against maltreatment of 
animals and they are pushing for animal rights and protection. Some of the 
commonly known organizations include: World Organization for Animal 
Health, Humane Society International (HSI), and Animal Kind International. 
 
The continuous occurrence of cases where animals are maltreated is indicative 
of some loopholes in the laws and policies developed by different stakeholders 
in stopping malpractices towards animals. We feel that the consequences of 
physical abuses such as beating animals or depriving them of food reveal a 
deeper cultural problem requiring serious reflection and correction. In our 
understanding, Malawian cultures have a utilitarian ethical orientation towards 
animals which makes it difficult to develop a proper moral standing towards 
animal protection. This paper will discuss the utilitarian ethical orientation and 
its influence in animal maltreatment in section two. Further, we believe that 
there are various cultural beliefs and doctrines that contribute towards animal 
cruelty in Malawi. This will be discussed in section three. In section four we 
will suggest a new ethical foundation that can help defend animal protection 
through rights of animals which can liberate them from various forms of 
maltreatment. 
 




2. The Malawian utilitarian ethics and animal cruelty  
In this section we argue that the African ethical utilitarianism present in many 
Malawian cultures is the basis for current animal treatment and it is a source 
of maltreatment of animals in the country. By African ethical utilitarianism we 
refer to the view that actions are good or bad depending on whether they are 
useful or not to human subjects, or to the community, in particular. The idea of 
usefulness is understood as the degree to which they bring harmony and 
happiness to human subjects (see also Bentham 1983; Kant 1997). For 
example, the value of a mbuzi (goat) is determined based on what it offers to 
the community. Usefulness is therefore a determining factor of value; hence it 
is the only guarantor of moral justification. It accounts for why Africans as 
moral subjects have to care about something. Focus in African utilitarianism is 
on human subjects as moral agents and on the value they see in things. This 
suggests an African form of anthropocentricism3 which is generally 
considered in environmental ethics as consisting in claims that the nonhuman 
world and/or its parts have value in as much as they serve human beings. In 
animal ethics the dominant form of African anthropocentricism consists in the 
consideration of animals as having an instrumental value, thus they are useful 
insofar as they satisfy various human interests (see also Descartes 1993). This 
leads to the understanding that the community which is at the centre of 
everything has to care for animals, develop norms of action and norms of 
feeling insofar as animals have instrumental value for man.  
 
African anthropocentrism with its utilitarian orientation is rooted in the 
cultural belief that human beings were created and destined by God 
(Namalenga) to be at centre of everything.4 Mbiti in his work Introduction to 
African Religions (1986: 38) captures this aspect when he says: 
 
Because man thinks of himself as being at the 
center, he consequently sees the universe 
under that perspective. It is as if the whole 
                                                            
3 Note that anthropocentricism is present in Malawian general traditional 
ethics known as umunthu/Ubuntu ethics due to its focus on the community. 
4 For further understanding of African religions and the idea of God and 
creation see also Appiah 1998:245-274; Amanze 2003; and Chakanza 
1987. 




universe exists for man’s sake. Therefore 
African peoples look for the usefulness (or 
otherwise) of the universe to man. This means 
both what the world can do for man, and how 
man can use the world for his own good. 
 
African subjects themselves occupy the center of the universe. Everything that 
is not human is their instrument. In fact animals in Malawi have an 
instrumental value more especially in three forms of utilitarianism: (i) 
nutrition utilitarianism, (ii) cultural utilitarianism, and (iii) labour 
utilitarianism. 
 
Nutrition utilitarianism is the use of animals for food purposes. The relation 
between humans and animals in African context is firstly that of care 
conditioned by their value in providing food for the community. There is an 
understanding that if humans are cruel then they will not have good food when 
time comes for slaughtering. Cruelty in this context comes when animals are 
taken to the market to be sold. The mentality is that the one selling no longer 
owns the instrument, given that it is ready to become food. This is where 
animals are tied upside down on bicycles; they are transported for long 
distances to the market in a confined carriage, often lying one on top of the 
other, etc. In these situations, there is minimum concern that we are dealing 
with something that has life and feels pain just like humans. Further incidents 
of cruelty in Malawi are seen when animals are slaughtered. For example, 
chickens are sometimes killed by twisting their head/neck a number of times 
(Kupotokola khosi). Some vegetarians and animal rightists have strongly 
condemned the slaughtering of animals for food. But the idea of not killing 
animals for food seems to be far from being real in Malawi. 
 
Cultural utilitarianism is the use of animals for various cultural ends. For 
example, in the past, killing a fierce animal such as a lion had cultural 
significance. Those who killed these animals gained some social status, 
especially respect, in the community as courageous individuals. Today this 
practice is no longer emphasized in the society. The other area where animals 
are used as instruments is that of traditional medicine. This medicine is used 
either for physical healing of human subjects or for charms that help to 
improve human life in different areas. For example, some parts of animals are 




used to increase fertility and physical strength when fighting, among others. In 
early 1995, Goodson Chisupe from Balaka, a district in the Eastern Region of 
Malawi, developed Mchape which he claimed would cure HIV/AIDS. A 
crocodile’s gallbladder was used in Mchape (village cleansing from 
witchcraft) and this meant that some crocodiles had to be killed in order to be 
utilized for this practice. In addition, a hyena’s tail and other organs are known 
to be used for medicinal concoctions in different areas. For example, it is 
believed that a hyena’s tail makes people fall into a deep slumber and 
facilitates the stealing of their commodities by thieves at night. Apart from 
traditional medicine, animals are used for sacrifice in Malawian traditional 
context. This practice may be observed in traditional religions and also among 
traditional witchdoctors. Domesticated animals such as goats and chickens are 
generally victims of this practice. 
 
Labour utilitarianism is the use of animals as a source of labour. In Malawi 
domestic animals such as cattle and donkeys are commonly used for this end. 
In this context there are various forms of maltreatment of animals by human 
subjects. In most areas these animals are used for transport and gardening, 
especially in the Central Region of Malawi. As beasts of burden, animals are 
forced to carry very heavy loads and are often whipped hard so that they 
move, even when they show signs of being tired. Most of them have wounds 
inflicted by the lashes which they receive whenever they convey the message 
that the load is too much for them. Because of the human interest to complete 
a certain business quickly and earn more money, these animals are whipped 
and forced to go quickly often against their ability and interest. Animals in this 
circumstance work under instinctive fear of being whipped. 
 
3. Umunthu ethics and cruelty to animals 
We argue that apart from ethical utilitarianism, Umunthu ethics, with its 
conception of the ‘unjust person’ or ‘morally incorrect person’ in the 
community and his/her punishment, greatly influences the treatment of 
animals in Malawi. While Malawian utilitarian ethics concentrates on an 
individual and the things he/she uses (everything that surrounds him/her), in 
Umunthu/Ubuntu ethics focus is on an individual and his community. An 
action is considered morally good when it promotes harmonious living in the 
community, otherwise it is regarded as bad (Metz 2007, Kayuni and 
Tambulasi 2012). A person with Umunthu is the one who lives with integrity 




in the community. Although the communitarianism in Umunthu/Ubuntu has 
been decisive in uniting Africans, more especially by encouraging values of 
unity, collaboration, etc, in the fight against colonialism, it excludes animals in 
its ethical community. Often animals are metaphorically included in the 
community of the immoral. This tendency makes it difficult or rather 
impossible to develop animal ethics within Umunthu ethics. Our interest is not 
on expounding Umunthu ethics in details but that of focusing on how the 
moral discourse and moral beliefs become a ground for exclusion and cruelty 
towards animals.  
 
Moral discourse within Umunthu ethics tends to metaphorically conceptualize 
and associate immorality with animality. This thought and practice reveals a 
negative perception and consideration of animals as generally belonging to an 
inferior order or class of beings deprived of any moral goodness. In the 
Malawian moral conceptual system, a person without Umunthu is often 
considered as an animal. This is clearly seen in the commonly used proverb in 
Umunthu ethics, Kali kokha n’kanyama, ali awiri ndi anthu, which is literally 
translated as, “The one who is alone is an animal and those that are two are 
human beings” (see Kayuni and Tambulasi 2012; Chakanza 2000; Kayange 
2014). This is suggestive of the idea that a morally good person abides by 
communal values that are at the heart of this society. The one who acts alone 
does not qualify as a complete person in the community of human subjects. 
Respect towards certain animals is further affected as they are metaphorically 
used in a moral discourse to represent specific immoral situations. For 
example, it is common to hear Malawians say Iwe ndiye ndi galu, “You are 
really a dog”, which immediately implies that one is immoral. One’s actions 
are considered immoral by likening them to those performed by a dog which is 
deprived of any moral quality. This is further suggestive of the fact that issues 
of moral correctness cannot arise in the context of animals. Similarly, we say 
that, Iwe ndiye ndi mbuzi, which is literarily translated as, “You are really a 
goat”. This also shows that the subject in question lacks Umunthu properties 
and behaves like a mere animal. This is a person who behaves badly in the 
society. In cases where such a person is highly corrupted in moral quality to 
the point that he/she kills other people, etc., the term Chirombo (deadly animal 
or simply a beast) is used to represent this subject. We believe that with this 
indirect perception of animals replete in moral discourse, it is difficult to 
develop moral norms that protect animals. 




Apart from the moral discourse that relegates animals to a non-moral status, 
there are various moral beliefs that contribute to a negative understanding of 
certain animals. The idea behind these beliefs is that some animals represent 
certain immoral acts or morally corrupted individuals after their death. Here 
we will focus on three beliefs that stigmatize animals as representatives of 
immoral people or behaviours namely, animals as reincarnations of dead evil 
doers in the society, animals as familiars when committing immoral acts, and 
animals as representations of vices (see also Mbiti 1986: 119 ff; Schoffeleers 
1997: 99 ff; van Breugel 2001).  
 
When it comes to considering animals as reincarnations of the dead evil doers 
in the society, it is believed in Umunthu ethics that when a person without 
Umunthu when dies, he/she may be transformed into a wild animal. This idea 
is captured well in van Braugel (2001: 86) in the following passage:  
 
Some people believe that at their death they 
can become a wild animal, a wild pig, or a 
leopard (translated: munthu akafa auka 
chirombo, kapena nguluwe, kapena 
kambuku). A leper is believed to become a 
hippo (munthu wa khate akuti auka mbvuwu) 
and a witch (mfiti) a crocodile (ng’ona).  
 
Beliefs such as these create grounds for mistreatment or even the death of 
certain innocent animals. For example, a wild animal or a tamed animal can be 
harmed, chased in its habitat or killed because of such a belief. The belief in 
the cited passage promotes exclusion, and at times, violence towards animals 
such as hippos, crocodiles, and others. The problem here is that it is 
impossible to develop norms that will defend these animals given that humans 
are often not very sure whether the animal in question is actually a dead 
person who is back to life or is a natural animal. 
 
The belief where animals are considered as familiars when committing 
immoral acts deals with those situations where an immoral person willingly 
performs certain rituals and transforms his/her appearance into an animal or 
something else in order to scare or harm other human beings. This creates the 
understanding that not all animals that we see are ‘real animals’ in the 




ordinary sense; some are actually immoral people in animal form. Some of the 
animals that are victims of this belief are kadzidzi (owl), nkhwenzule (little 
owl), fisi (hyena), mleme (bat), certain snakes5 and house lizards. Cruelty 
towards these and other animals is very ubiquitous in Malawian rural as well 
as urban settings. For example, an owl is stoned, injured and sometimes killed 
because of its perceived connection with witches and wizards. A bat is 
maltreated and sometimes killed for a similar reason. The belief is that one can 
never be sure whether he or she is dealing with a real bat or owl, or a 
transformed immoral person. 
 
Animals are also considered as representation of vices. Lying as a vice is often 
connected with a lizard because of the belief that it is responsible for lying to 
God that human beings do not want to live forever but face death. Behind this 
idea is the story among the Chewa people that was created to respond to the 
question of death. Lizard is believed to have received the true message from 
man that he wants to live forever but twisted this message. This thinking leads 
to maltreatment of lizards more especially by small children in the village. 
Some will search for them and kill them or stone them and let them go in pain. 
In some circumstances, a lizard is seen as representing laziness or a person 
who is slow in doing things. For reasons unknown to us, a lizard is protected 
from cruel acts from children or any form of mistreatment by a taboo which 
indicates that ‘when touched, a lizard spits flames of fire.’ Gluttony or 
voraciousness is associated with a dog, and in some circumstances with a pig. 
It is associated with a dog because he/she eats fast and to a pig because s/he 
can eat almost anything. We believe that using animals to represent vices may 
in some circumstances encourage negative perceptions towards them and in 
some cases even maltreatment. 
 
4. Indirect animal rights ethics in Malawi 
African utilitarianism and Umunthu ethics as well as its elements lead to the 
maltreatment of animals. This perception may be corrected by introducing 
indirect animal rights in Malawi. The proposal in this paper is the introduction 
                                                            
5 There is an exception put on chilele, a type of snake that is respected for 
religious reasons and no one is allowed to harm in the community. 
Protection of animals on religious grounds is also common among the 
Hindu (see Dwivedi 2000)  and other races (see Sahni, P. 2008). 




of indirect rights as a basis of human responsibility. This may be done by 
drawing insights from Lectures on Ethics by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).6 
In a section titled Of Duties Towards Animals and Spirit (Collin’s lecture 
notes) Kant questions whether we have direct duties7 towards animals or not 
(Kant 1997: 212 ff.; Keller 2010:82-83). According to him, while human 
beings have a duty towards themselves and their fellow humans, they have no 
direct duty towards animals. Kant argues that animals are not conscious, and 
therefore they are a means to an end. That end is man. This alludes to the fact 
that human beings are morally bound only to those beings that are conscious, 
those who are like them. This echoes the influence of Kant’s predecessors as it 
can be evidenced by the ideas of Thomas Aquinas and Rene Descartes (Keller 
2010:63; 69 ff.). The claim that nature is a means to an end seems to suggest 
an instrumental value.  Nature is considered as a mere instrument towards an 
end. In fact, for Kant, animals are instruments to be utilized by human beings. 
This can be traced in his statement that the end that he is referring to is man. 
This is similar to African utilitarianism where human beings are presented as 
at the center of the universe and all other animals and other things in the 
environment are there to serve humans. 
 
Although Kant dismissed human duties towards animals, he nonetheless 
argued that human beings have indirect duties towards nature. Human beings 
have a duty to respect animals based on the idea that those duties are offered 
indirectly to fellow human beings (Kant 1997). Further, there are some 
analogies between human nature and animal nature which strengthen the idea 
of respecting animals just in the same way human beings respect a fellow 
human being. Based on such analogies, human beings have duties towards 
animals in virtue of the characteristics which correspond to human nature. For 
example, one can argue that it is not proper to inflict pain on animals because 
                                                            
6 As is well-known most of the philosophers followed the Aristotelian and 
the Judeo-Christian Ethics, which considered the environment under the 
domination of human beings. This was further underlined by the father of 
modern philosophy, Rene Descartes and others. 
7The notion of ‘duty’ has a central role in his deontological view in ethics. 
As is well known, the term ‘deontological’ is derived from two Greek 
words, Deon which is translated as ‘duty’ and ‘Logos’ which refers to 
‘science’ or ‘discourse’. 




such pain is similar to the one felt by human beings. It is because of this aspect 
that the moment human beings perform their duties to what is manifested in 
animals, they indirectly perform a duty to human nature. According to him, 
the service of a dog deserves reward just as human service does. A dog that 
has chased or scared a thief has done a good thing and can be compared to a 
house owner who chases or scares a thief. We can further observe that most of 
the behaviours or feelings human beings have towards their young ones are 
also replicated by most of the animals. For instance, when a baby is born, 
human beings do care for him/her, creating a conducive environment, making 
sure that s/he grows up in an appropriate manner. Similarly, animals like 
monkeys will do something similar. In some circumstances they have been 
observed to do even better than some human beings in performing those acts. 
Observing such animals performing acts akin to human beings helps us to love 
them because we see how they show care towards other young animals. There 
is therefore no point for human beings to be cruel towards animals if they are 
able to show affection towards each other. Being cruel to them is the same as 
demeaning ourselves, as it is expressed by the following words of Kant:  
 
Any action whereby we may torment animals, 
or let them suffer distress, or otherwise treat 
them without love, is demeaning to 
ourselves.8 
 
This statement clearly suggests that if some animal acts are analogous to 
human acts then we have duties towards them, given that they spring from the 
same principles as well as impulses. Building on the aspect that human duties 
towards animals are indirect, Kant focuses more on the action and wants to 
discourage too much concern on the idea that animals are irrational given that 
they cannot make judgments (Keller, R. D. 2010:82 ff.); and this makes it 
difficult for animals to judge human actions as good or bad (Kant, 1997: 212 
                                                            
8 See also Christine M. Korsgaard’s work, Fellow Creatures: Kantian 
Ethics and Our Duties to Animals, delivered as a Tanner Lecture on Human 
Values at the University of Michigan, February 6, 2004.  Forthcoming in 
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, edited by Grethe B. Peterson. Salt 
Lake City:  The University of Utah Press, Volume 25/26; and on the web at 
www.TannerLectures.utah.edu. 




ff.). In fact, Kant noted that a man does no wrong to his dog when he shoots 
him because of old age. The dog is irrational since it cannot judge. What about 
the action of killing a dog? Can it be justified as wrong or right? In the context 
of indirect duties a human being who kills a dog belonging to someone or 
appreciated by someone (this could be for aesthetic reasons) has failed 
towards humanity. His failure consists in the fact that it is his duty to respect 
humanity in itself, and killing is against this aspect. By analogy, both animals 
and human beings manifest in a similar way the aspect of life which is 
indispensable to human beings. This idea of respecting life fits well in the 
Malawian traditional context where human subjects are expected to be 
responsible towards other human beings based on the understanding that life is 
sacred. This aspect originates from the belief that life was created by God and 
given to human being as a gift. Human life in itself is sacred and this accords 
it an intrinsic value.  Sacredness of human life therefore provides a moral 
ground for developing human rights and related norms, and indirectly, animal 
rights and norms of action.  
 
Kant sees a link between what human beings do to animals and what they do 
to fellow human beings in their behaviour. The point is that if one is cruel 
towards animals, he/she will likely show cruelty towards his/her fellow human 
beings (A cruel person is called Munthu wa nkhanza). This is also true for a 
person who is kind to others; he/she will most likely develop compassion and 
kindness towards animals. We therefore think that the maxim that humans 
should not be cruel to fellow humans must be indirectly extended to animals. 
No human being is justified to be cruel towards animals. 
 
Conclusion 
We want to conclude this paper by echoing Kantian injunction that, “No man 
ought to mar the beauty of nature; for what he has no use for may still be of 
use to someone else.” We believe that nature has an aesthetic value, and thus 
the beauty of nature must be respected and all acts of cruelty towards animals 
are a threat to this aspect. Animals must be lovable for their own sake as an art 
work of the creator. We further understand that animals may have an 
instrumental value in the context of nutrition but this doesn’t justify any 
violation of their indirect rights. Although our position may in some respects 
seem to promote a welfarist position, it is clear that our concern is promoting 
indirect animal rights. The link between our concern (indirect animal rights) 




and welfarist position can be explored further as an extension of this paper. 
For the purposes of this work, we limit our discussion to indirect animal rights 
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